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Executive summary
This Special Report presents a strategy for the future 
relationship between Indonesia’s National Police—known 
as POLRI—and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). It draws 
on 60 interviews with current and retired police officers, 
officials from other Australian and Indonesian agencies, and 
academic experts in related fields.
The benefits of past AFP–POLRI cooperation have been felt 
largely in the transactional dimension of crime fighting, but 
the police-to-police relationship benefits other government 
agencies and the broader bilateral relationship too. Benefits 
have also accrued to the community and businesses in both 
countries, and the police-to-police relationship has promoted 
Australian and Indonesian interests in Southeast Asia.
While these benefits are clear, the relationship has reached 
an inflection point created by a reduced prominence for 
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some capacity building initiatives and recent revelations 
about Australian intelligence activities relating to Indonesia. 
Neither the AFP nor POLRI can assume that their relationship 
will return to the status quo ante after a bilateral ‘code of 
conduct’ is negotiated.
This report presents a strategy for the future POLRI–AFP 
relationship in two parts. The first part examines the near 
term to early 2015. POLRI and the AFP should first aim to 
restore full trust and cooperation in all relevant policing 
areas, especially in cybercrime. Early initiatives could 
include a 10-year celebration for the Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation, workshops for future AFP and 
POLRI leaders, and a request for POLRI officers to support 
the AFP during the G20 meeting in November 2014. It would 
also be worth sponsoring an international ‘needs analysis’ 
for POLRI. Reinstating funding for the Law Enforcement 
Cooperation Program is needed to promote the AFP’s 
flexibility and responsiveness during this time.
An Australian forensic Investigator, right, looks at her Indonesian counterpart during an Investigation of the two bomb explosions at cafes on Jimbaran Beach, Bali, Indonesia, 3 October 2005.  
AP Photo/Ed Wray via AAP.
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Broad economic and technological changes over the 
next decade will increase Indonesia’s wealth and expand 
its middle class. These changes will have important 
implications for law enforcement.
In particular they’ll highlight the police-to-police 
relationship’s key objective: promoting democracy, 
security and prosperity through the rule of law. But that 
shouldn’t be the only aim: it’s possible to leverage the 
relationship to support institutional development in 
POLRI, to promote whole-of-government operations and 
policymaking, and to enhance regional security.
Central to this strategy is deepening and broadening 
the relationship: deepening it by adding new areas 
of cooperation that build on previous investments, 
and broadening it with activities in Australia, across 
Indonesia and in Southeast Asia.
The second part presents initiatives to achieve these 
longer term objectives, including a formal police alumni 
association and short- and long-term secondments 
between POLRI and the AFP. The first capacity building 
priority should be to complete the existing cyber centre 
project. It would also be worth funding teleconferencing 
facilities for the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation and provincial-level police headquarters 
so more training can be provided by the centre. Beyond 
that, new ideas should emerge from the needs analysis 
mentioned above.
Providing better ways to exchange information with 
business about criminal threats, especially in Indonesia, 
is another longer term initiative that would have direct 
benefits for economic development.
Australia and Indonesia have shared interests in 
Southeast Asia—one of which is a successful democratic 
transition in Myanmar. The AFP and POLRI could 
cooperate to provide capacity building assistance to the 
Myanmar police force to help it become an independent, 
professional police organisation.
This new level of activity should be supported by a 
ministerial-level meeting that involves Australia’s 
Minister for Justice and POLRI’s Chief, who has 
ministerial status in the Indonesian Government.
On a practical note, both forces must have enough 
people with language skills. Adding training pool 
positions for language students to the AFP’s staffing 
structure would ease the burden of releasing officer for 
language training before deployment.
The Australian Government could explore a range 
of ways to fund this relationship, including closing 
some positions in Indonesia to fund places for POLRI 
officers in Australia, targeting investments to protect 
Commonwealth revenue, and using foreign aid for 
initiatives that promote the rule of law in Indonesia.
A remarkable partnership
Of the many elements of bilateral cooperation between 
Australia and Indonesia, one of the most remarkable is the 
partnership forged between the Indonesian National Police 
(POLRI1), and the Australian Federal Police (AFP).
Over the past four decades, and especially since the late 
1990s, the two police forces have built a relationship 
based on trust, mutual benefit and shared concern for 
fighting crime. It’s a relationship that’s moved from simple 
information sharing, to capacity building, and into truly 
cooperative operations. It’s also withstood most of the 
fluctuations in the broader bilateral relationship. This is a rare 
achievement for any international partnership, and one both 
sides must value and protect.
What’s more, the AFP–POLRI relationship has bought 
significant benefits to both countries’ interests, most 
notably in cooperation against transnational crime and 
related security threats, such as terrorism. The relationship’s 
also been beneficial for each organisation, as it’s added 
to their sense of mission and heightened their standing as 
police forces.
But will this close cooperation continue? And, if it does, what 
shape could it take into the future? These are important 
questions because the revelations of late 2013 and early 2014 
about Australian intelligence activities concerning Indonesia 
have created a rift in the bilateral relationship. This rift has led 
Indonesia to suspend cooperation in some security-related 
areas, including people smuggling and cybercrime.
That’s troubling because Indonesian President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono has previously said that police 
cooperation—in contrast to defence and intelligence 
relationships—‘can usually be done without much political 
inhibition’.2 That the police relationship was affected in this 
case is therefore a concern.
But it’s also an opportunity for both parties to think about 
the future. We can be sure the relationship won’t be resumed 
as if nothing has happened, and it’s also worth observing 
that the police relationship has already achieved a level 
of maturity in some areas. Both forces could therefore see 
this time as an inflection point in their relationship, and 
think about what they want their cooperation to deliver into 
the future.
This paper provides analysis and recommendations designed 
to help the AFP and POLRI set a course for their future. It 
begins with a brief description of POLRI–AFP cooperation 
over the past few decades and analyses its benefits for law 
enforcement, the bilateral relationship, and the broader 
regional objectives of Australia and Indonesia.
Next, it outlines a strategy for the future police-to-police 
relationship in two parts. The first covers the period from 
now until when the bilateral relationship is restored after the 
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‘spying scandal’—which seems unlikely before early 2015 
unless favourable conditions emerge sooner. The second part 
looks out 5–10 years. This is important because both nations 
will need a functioning police-to-police relationship due to 
the impact of changing socioeconomic, technological and 
strategic conditions, and an expected increase in criminal 
threats to Australia’s and Indonesia’s national prosperity 
and security.
The recommendations for both periods are based on similar 
objectives and include a focus on people-to-people links, 
leader-to-leader interaction and capacity building initiatives. 
If leveraged well, it’s possible that the police-to-police 
relationship could also make the overall bilateral relationship 
more resilient.
Other Australian and Indonesian agencies play roles in all of 
the activities described in this report, but it’s not possible to 
discuss those contributions in detail. As a result, the report 
does not consider the significant contributions of the two 
countries’ law and justice departments, prosecution offices, 
customs and immigration agencies, and intelligence and 
counterterrorism bodies; or specialist agencies such as 
Australia’s AUSTRAC or Indonesia’s financial intelligence unit, 
anti-corruption commission or National Narcotics Bureau.
This paper is based on 60 interviews with Australian and 
Indonesian officials, retired and serving police officers, 
academics and businesspeople. Representatives of 
international organisations with a role in policing have also 
been consulted. The authors are particularly grateful for 
the assistance provided by the AFP, POLRI and Australia’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, including during 
field work in Indonesia.
From information sharing to joint 
operations
The police-to-police relationship between Australia 
and Indonesia was founded upon a desire to exchange 
information about crime.
Australia posted its first police liaison officer to Jakarta 
in 1977, with a remit focused on drug trafficking, training 
delivery and facilitating enquiries by Australian law 
enforcement agencies.3 With the exception of a five-year 
hiatus starting in 1987, Australia has maintained a 
policing presence in Indonesia ever since. Today there are 
around 30 AFP officers working in Indonesia on a range of 
cooperation initiatives.
Indonesia stationed its first liaison officer in Canberra in 
2003. The early priorities for POLRI’s liaison officer included 
counterterrorism cooperation and building the Australian 
side of the POLRI–AFP relationship. Once those priorities 
were achieved, the POLRI officer became more focused on 
transnational crime, and the position was retitled ‘police 
attaché’. This change reflected the attaché’s dual reporting 
lines to both the POLRI Commissioner and the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry, and broader duties involving legal affairs.
Expanding priorities
The 1997 POLRI–AFP memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
established a firm basis for an expanding relationship. It 
focused on cooperation against transnational crime and 
agreed processes for consultation, criminal intelligence 
exchange and joint investigations. While this MOU was 
important, the relationship was just one among many for 
both the AFP and POLRI at the time.
The relevance of the relationship increased as connections 
between crime and the interests of both nations expanded 
after President Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 and the 
subsequent period known as reformasi. One of the main 
changes as Indonesia returned to democratic governance 
was POLRI’s re-emergence from its subordinate position 
to the Indonesian military. The force needed significant 
assistance to make the transition and it welcomed 
international help.
The AFP also became more heavily involved in Indonesia at 
the same time. In addition to providing officers to support 
the independence referendum in East Timor and providing 
a liaison officer to POLRI headquarters in 1999, the AFP 
and other Australian Government agencies increased their 
support to counter-people-smuggling initiatives as the 
number of these ventures grew. The new support included 
patrol boats and another liaison officer. Additional advice on 
physical security, and offering the Management of Serious 
Crime course in Jakarta, were further demonstrations of the 
expanding relationship.
These instances show how cooperation between the AFP and 
POLRI broadened, even at a time when bilateral relations 
were severely strained by the events of 1999. While these 
activities were to remain important into the next decade, 
terrorism would bring a new focus to the relationship.
Terrorism: not new, but different
While Australia–Indonesia cooperation on terrorism 
pre-dated the al-Qaeda attacks of September 2001, those 
events led to a new AFP–POLRI agreement on combating 
international terrorism in February 2002, and a renewed MOU 
on combating transnational crime four months later.4
The agreements were timely. On 12 October 2002, the 
Indonesian-led terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah exploded 
two bombs in nightclubs in Kuta, Bali. What followed was a 
remarkable act of detective work amid significant domestic 
political pressure and close international interest (see box).
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Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali bombings—
October 2002
A cell of Jemaah Islamiyah members detonated 
explosive devices in the tourist district of Kuta on the 
Indonesian island of Bali on 12 October 2002. In two 
near-simultaneous attacks, 202 people were killed, 
including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians and others 
from 20 other countries. Hundreds more were injured. A 
third attack occurred the same night at the US Consulate 
in nearby Denpasar, injuring one person. The AFP and 
POLRI began a joint investigation almost immediately, 
under Indonesian leadership.
At the time of the bombings, a number of AFP officers 
were already in Bali and within 24 hours a team from the 
AFP and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
flew in to join them—including experts in disaster victim 
identification and bomb-blast investigation. The overall 
international effort in this investigation followed, with 
10 countries being represented at the forward command 
post in Kuta.
The investigation involved identifying 7,300 possible 
witnesses and then processing 600 statements. Forensic 
teams examined 2,900 exhibits from 46 sites across 
Indonesia and tested other samples in Australia. Success 
soon followed, with the arrest of four principal suspects 
between 5 November 2002 and 12 January 2003.
At the height of the operation, around 100 Australian 
police were deployed to Bali, including officers from the 
AFP and state police forces. The investigation was also 
supported by 400 officers based in Australia, making this 
the largest investigation in the AFP’s history.
—AFP, ‘How we handled a crisis that shook the nation: a round-the-clock response’, 
Platypus Magazine, December 2002; AFP, Annual report 2002–03, pp. 30-32
Within hours of the blasts, POLRI Chief Da’i Bachtiar and 
AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty discussed how the AFP could 
provide assistance. In the view of senior Indonesian police 
officers, Australian expertise in crime scene management, 
intelligence analysis and computer and bomb forensics 
would be important contributions to the investigation.
Operation Alliance was a multinational effort. While 
the Indonesian police under Brigadier General Pastika 
led all aspects of the investigation, POLRI gave the AFP 
unprecedented access to the crime scene. POLRI also 
provided access to witnesses from the beginning and shared 
the task of analysing evidence.5 Further cooperation included 
a joint investigation by Indonesian and Australian police 
officers, led in the field by senior Indonesian detective Gories 
Mere, to capture the suspected terrorists after they’d moved 
back to Java.
During this phase, officers from both countries lived and 
travelled together in the field, shared information openly, 
and coordinated support from Jakarta and Canberra. The 
effectiveness of the investigation was demonstrated by the 
conviction of more than 30 terrorists, including seven of the 
main perpetrators.6
Cooperation to fight terrorism and 
transnational crime
Within weeks of the 2002 Bali bombings, the Australian 
Government increased its commitment to helping Indonesia 
build its counterterrorism capacity. The early priorities were 
organised into initiatives in areas such as infrastructure, 
information systems, physical security, assistance 
with legislation, and training for POLRI and other law 
enforcement officials.
Enhanced cooperation in counterterrorism investigations 
was among the most important priorities of the time. 
Once the Bali investigation was complete, the AFP’s 
Operation Alliance team formed the Jakarta Operations 
Centre. This group provided close support to POLRI’s major 
counterterrorism operations over the next few years, 
including after the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 
Australian Embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali bombing. The 
Jakarta Operations Centre also worked alongside POLRI’s 
investigative taskforce, known as SATGAS BOM, in its field 
investigations. Today’s smaller team, now known as the 
Jakarta Regional Cooperation Team, focuses on information 
sharing and training.
Building on the desire for even stronger cooperation, the 
Australian and Indonesian Governments agreed in 2004 to 
create a school that would focus on transnational crime and 
counterterrorism. The resulting initiative was named the 
Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).
Located in Semarang, Central Java, and opened in July 2004, 
JCLEC has become a bricks-and-mortar reminder of the 
interests and experience shared by Australia and Indonesia. 
The centre began with a strong focus on counterterrorism 
training for Indonesian and regional police forces, but it now 
offers courses on a wide range of transnational crime areas 
and broader topics such as Islamic law.
More than 15,000 students from 69 countries have 
participated in nearly 600 training experiences at JCLEC 
since it opened its doors. Most are from POLRI, but around 
20% of places on each course are reserved for officers from 
other countries. The centre also trains other law enforcement 
officials, including those with border security, anticorruption 
and judicial responsibilities.
Other key initiatives during this time were designed to 
improve POLRI’s physical and information infrastructure. 
Principal among these were the Transnational Crime 
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Cooperation Centre, the Multinational Operational Support 
Team, and the Republic of Indonesia Bomb Data Centre. 
Also important were training and equipment for areas such 
as disaster victim identification, fingerprinting and, later, 
DNA analysis. Most of these initiatives included equipment, 
office accommodation, information technology and, perhaps 
most importantly, skilled AFP officers to work beside their 
Indonesian counterparts. This close suport enhanced their 
collective ability to solve crime, which became increasingly 
important as the areas of security cooperation expanded.
Continued evolution of the POLRI–AFP 
relationship
While counterterrorism remains a bilateral priority, 
Australia and Indonesia now have a broader range of shared 
security challenges. These include persistent crimes, such 
as drug smuggling, people smuggling, human trafficking 
and illegal fishing, and newer concerns arising from 
technological change.
One of the most important new initiatives was the Cyber 
Crime Investigation Centre. Launched in 2011, the centre 
is a joint operation that sits within POLRI headquarters in 
South Jakarta. In the years since, satellite offices have also 
been rolled out in four major Indonesian cities, which has 
increased the number of skilled cyber analysts in POLRI.7
This period has also seen AFP and POLRI make efforts 
to sustain already delivered projects. This has included 
updated equipment and new iterations of training courses. 
Much of this cooperation has been funded through official 
development assistance, and is essential to sustaining the 
two forces’ cooperative efforts against transnational crime.8
Close cooperation has also been required in times of tragedy, 
such as after the 2007 Yogyakarta air crash, and after the 2009 
Black Saturday bushfires in Australia when POLRI provided 
six officers to assist with victim identification.9 This kind of 
cooperation is significant because it familiarises officers with 
each other’s methods and conditions, and shows that AFP 
and POLRI officers can ‘reinforce’ each other to cope with 
major incidents.
While this decade of very close cooperation has achieved 
much, it’s had to withstand some buffeting winds too. 
These have been created by general tensions in the bilateral 
relationship, and more specific matters such as premature 
ministerial comments about important arrests and 
travel warnings in 2007.10 This period also included other 
controversial events, including the arrest of the ‘Bali Nine’ 
heroin ring in 2005, a summons issued to visiting Jakarta 
governor Sutiyoso in 2007 over his alleged role in the 
Balibo Five killings of 197511, concerns over the detention 
of Indonesian minors involved in people smuggling, and 
the Oceanic Viking stand-off in 2012. These events show 
how conflicting policy objectives can create difficulty in 
the relationship, and how nimble footwork is needed to 
maintain balance. 
People smuggling again
Another area that’s required considerable agility from both 
forces is people smuggling. For a time after 2002, people 
smuggling was reduced to a minor concern due to the decline 
in irregular movements between Australia and Indonesia. 
However, shifts in international conditions and Australian 
policy after 2008 would re-raise people smuggling to a 
prominence that persists today.12
When unauthorised arrivals reached a new peak in 2009, 
the AFP established a renewed relationship with POLRI’s 
People Smuggling Taskforce. The taskforce’s early focus 
was on disrupting people-smuggling journeys, assisted by 
Australian funding, training, equipment for provincial forces 
and joint operations support. In order to make the most of 
its core skills and maximise its resources, the AFP switched 
from disruption operations to providing investigative support 
and intelligence on the people-smuggling syndicates as the 
numbers of asylum seekers travelling through Indonesia grew 
in 2012.
Policy changes by the Australian Government in mid-2013 
led to increased bilateral cooperation against people 
smuggling for a time13, but revelations of November 2013 
about Australian intelligence activities concerning Indonesia 
led to a freeze in bilateral cooperation on people smuggling 
that’s likely to continue for some time yet. This freeze makes 
it worth examining what this history of cooperation has 
actually delivered.
The impacts of the AFP–POLRI 
relationship
Cooperation between POLRI and the AFP is often called an 
‘investment’: it includes ‘deposits’ and ‘withdrawals’, like a 
bank account, and multi-purpose infrastructure that others 
can use. Regardless of the analogy used to describe it, it’s 
clear that the relationship delivers real returns at many levels.
The analysis below is based on discussions with people 
with a close involvement in the bilateral relationship, so it 
reflects aggregated viewpoints and inferences from those 
discussions. It doesn’t claim to be an ‘audit’, or allow for a 
quantitative analysis of costs and benefits, but it provides 
an assessment of the workings of this longstanding 
collaboration that demonstrates its considerable value to 
both nations.
Police-to-police impacts
The day-to-day work done by Indonesian and Australian 
police officers in fighting crime delivers the clearest benefits 
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of this relationship. These include practical assistance, such 
as when the POLRI attaché in Australia helped to manage the 
cases of young Indonesians caught fishing illegally, and many 
cases that have been resolved through information sharing or 
on-the-ground cooperation.
Capacity building assistance—the transfer of skills and 
equipment to improve another’s ability to operate—for 
POLRI has been extremely beneficial because it’s promoted 
interoperability between the two forces. It’s also been 
possible to leverage capacity building assistance in one area 
to obtain cooperation in another. As a result, both forces 
are better able to meet each other’s requests and conduct 
joint operations.
Training has also led to positive benefits. According to one 
senior Indonesian officer, training at JCLEC is highly valued 
by POLRI officers because it’s modified to Indonesian needs 
and provides skills they can apply in the workplace. POLRI 
has also passed skills and knowledge to the AFP during 
this time, particularly on terrorism, counter-radicalisation 
and transnational crime. It’s also helped to broaden AFP’s 
cross-cultural experience more generally, as many AFP 
officers gained skills for working in Southeast Asia by virtue 
of their Indonesian postings.
These benefits arise because AFP and POLRI officers know 
each other, understand each other’s situations, focus on 
being police, have direct access to their counterparts, and 
feel comfortable discussing mutual concerns. Many 
interviewees for this project described interactions with their 
colleagues in terms of ‘mutual benefits’, ‘mutual trust’ and 
‘close collaboration’. They also described a ‘low key’ 
approach to cooperation that places a premium on respect 
for jurisdiction.
Despite the success, there have been instances in which 
the closeness of the relationship might have contained 
some detriment. The case of the Bali Nine could fall into this 
category. Critics might also say that the AFP hasn’t leveraged 
its influence to promote human rights and accountability 
in POLRI. Some initiatives, such as the Multinational 
Operational Support Team and early stages of the Bomb 
Data Centre, didn’t necessarily deliver as expected.14 Some 
Indonesians might be concerned about how the large number 
of Australian police in their country affects Indonesian 
sovereignty. And some think the focus on counterterrorism 
and then people smuggling since the early 2000s has reduced 
the attention paid to other crimes, especially drugs. Such 
instances highlight the complexity of the relationship as 
much as anything else. Clearly, some compromise has been 
needed to achieve what leaders in both countries have 
considered to be in their interests.
Impacts on organisational identity
According to a number of long-serving AFP officers, both 
the international network and its leading role in overseas 
counterterrorism have made the AFP distinct from its state 
counterparts. The practical benefit, which was especially 
noticeable to some after the 2002–03 Bali investigation, 
was that the operations in Indonesia helped to cement 
the AFP’s ‘sense of mission’. That investigation enhanced 
the AFP’s national and international profile, and provided 
an opportunity to show leadership among Australian 
police forces.
Capacity building assistance and successful responses to 
terrorist attacks have helped POLRI to assert itself as an 
institution separate from the military. This assistance, 
especially after the first Bali bombings, greatly improved 
POLRI’s credibility with government and the Indonesian 
people, according to one academic with deep experience in 
researching POLRI. This success has allowed POLRI to 
increase its legitimacy, despite competition from the 
Indonesian Army and continuing concerns about corruption.
A targeted Australian Federal Police operation, known as Operation Delphinium, resulted in arrests across Australia in relation to people smuggling investigations, 29 August 2013. Photos courtesy 
of the Australian Federal Police.
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Impacts for other government agencies
Other Australian and Indonesian departments and agencies 
have also accrued benefits from the AFP–POLRI relationship. 
For instance, the police-to-police relationship provides a 
conduit for Australian agencies to share information about 
matters such as human rights, biosecurity, money laundering 
and corruption with their Indonesian counterparts through 
JCLEC. These contacts also help Australian agencies broaden 
their discussions with Indonesian agencies into non-security 
areas. For example, cooperation on illegal fishing led to 
broader discussions about sustainable fisheries and marine 
conservation parks, according to one Australian official.
On the Indonesian side, the police-to-police relationship has 
brought numerous law enforcement, judicial and regulatory 
agencies together on important themes. These have 
included workshops on people smuggling, financial crime 
and corruption, and training for judges and prosecutors 
on counterterrorism laws and the interpretation of digital 
evidence. At the local level, cooperation between police 
and other law enforcement agencies in Indonesia has also 
addressed the exploitation of fishermen and dealt with some 
aspects of smuggling.
Broader impact on the bilateral relationship
The police-to-police relationship has also delivered benefits 
to the broader bilateral relationship. It’s certainly contributed 
to a ‘habit of cooperation’, and for a short time the police 
sustained the major link on security matters between the 
two neighbours. However, given the depth and breadth of the 
bilateral relationship, and the number of shared challenges, 
it’s important not to claim too much for the AFP’s and 
POLRI’s contribution.
Still, former Australian ambassadors to Indonesia and 
others highlighted the importance of the police-to-police 
relationship. In the view of many, it played an important 
role in helping the two countries to repair the rift created by 
the East Timor intervention, primarily because the police 
relationship provided mutual benefits.
The general public and the business communities in 
Indonesia and Australia also receive direct and indirect 
benefits from the police-to-police relationship. Because 
police are likely to be involved when citizens or businesses 
need help, good communication and cooperation 
between police forces can be very important for protecting 
legal rights. Contact between the AFP’s liaison officers 
in Indonesia and their colleagues in provincial police 
headquarters can also add an ‘international’ dimension to 
particular cases and help them receive attention.
Other direct benefits from the POLRI–AFP relationship 
include opportunities for industry arising from capacity 
building projects and information sharing—although 
not everyone in industry agrees with that. Private-sector 
participants in this project noted some improvements in 
Australia, particularly for information about criminal threats 
in Southeast Asia. The benefits weren’t so clear for those 
in Indonesia, however, because threat warnings from the 
Australian Government are generally delivered through 
general advice like travel advisories. Some Australian 
businesses in Indonesia also think that more information 
should be provided on criminal threats, although a suitable 
model for this doesn’t exist yet.
Benefits in Southeast Asia and elsewhere
In addition to these bilateral impacts, the AFP–POLRI 
relationship has been beneficial for both countries’ regional 
objectives and profiles.
In the case of JCLEC, the presence of regional police forces 
and international donors allows both Australia and Indonesia 
to promote issues of mutual concern. JCLEC has a multiplier 
effect, too. While there, all participants are encouraged 
to build new networks that, according to JCLEC’s leaders, 
encourage cooperation among them. This benefit is 
illustrated in the Regional Executive Leadership Program, 
which involves 20–30 senior police executives from Southeast 
Asia who hold influential policy and operational positions in 
their respective forces. JCLEC also helps both Australia and 
Indonesia to complement other regional training initiatives, 
including some by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime and INTERPOL.
The bomb data centres in Australia and Indonesia allow the 
AFP and POLRI to promote technical cooperation through the 
Southeast Asian Bomb Data Centre network. The network 
provides ‘an effective means for engaging with regional 
[bomb data centres] and maintaining an awareness of 
emerging capabilities and issues’, according to the Australian 
National Audit Office.15
The close relationship has also allowed cooperation in 
regional and global police meetings, such as the Chiefs of 
ASEAN Police (ASEANAPOL) forum and the Virtual Global 
Taskforce to combat online child sexual abuse. In these 
instances, POLRI and the AFP have introduced each other to 
the forums, where membership allows both to pursue their 
objectives on a broader basis.
An additional layer is the benefit that other countries receive 
from AFP–POLRI cooperation, including help to gain access 
to POLRI and the international coordinating role played 
by the AFP in major investigations. Once again, JCLEC is 
important because it’s a focal point for international donor 
contributions to POLRI—which reduces the transaction costs 
of cooperation—and it allows third countries’ liaison officers 
to engage POLRI through training courses.
Taken together, these activities—led prominently by 
joint operations and JCLEC—have a positive effect on the 
bilateral relationship and international police cooperation 
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such as the forensic laboratories have been completed. The 
Multinational Operational Support Team no longer functions, 
while the Transnational Crime Coordination Centre might 
be nearing the end of its useful purpose. In another major 
area—cooperation to curb people smuggling—it’s possible 
that policy changes might attenuate the trade again and 
reduce this as an area for future cooperation.
It’s also possible that some existing areas of cooperation are 
underutilised. While we shouldn’t forget JCLEC’s contribution 
in Indonesia, the numbers of POLRI officers studying in 
Australia and the numbers of Australian police studying in 
Indonesia are small in absolute and comparative terms.17
Still, a number of current activities remain relevant: JCLEC 
and capacity building activities such as the Republic 
of Indonesia Bomb Data Centre and the Cyber Crime 
Investigation Centre (once full cooperation resumes). These 
same initiatives are likely to remain relevant for the future, 
too, and may contain significant potential for growth.
An inflection point
When the political context and current status of capacity 
building cooperation are viewed together, it’s possible to 
describe the police-to-police relationship as being at an 
inflection point. There are now opportunities for both parties 
to reflect on the benefits of past links and think more about 
their future under new conditions.
Those conditions will be shaped by a number of factors, 
of which the political relationship is the most uncertain 
because of the upcoming 2014 legislative and presidential 
elections in Indonesia. It’s also possible that further Snowden 
revelations, or incidents involving people smugglers, could 
complicate ministerial discussions. As a result, it’s unlikely 
that the ‘new normal’ will become apparent until early 2015, 
and a clear political ‘OK’ will probably be needed to allow 
cooperation to recommence.
In that time, aspects of the police-to-police relationship 
will change. While strong links are likely to be sustained, 
some liaison officers will move to other work before full 
cooperation is restored. There will also be a need to restore 
trust in the cyber realm, so that current projects can continue 
and new ones might start. And POLRI’s needs for cooperation 
and support are likely to change in some ways, too. In other 
words, the POLRI of early 2015 will be at least subtly different 
from the force in November 2013.
Step by step, softly and quietly
Until the Indonesian Government provides a clear mandate 
to resume cooperation, the AFP and POLRI will probably 
use the tried and trusted methods they’ve employed for a 
long time: they’ll respect jurisdiction, stay in contact but 
in the background, work on and through people-to-people 
in the region. But no relationship should stand still: 
changes to needs and in the external environment mean 
that assumptions and conditions change quickly. As a 
consequence, it’s timely to consider how the AFP and 
POLRI could prepare for both the next phase of the bilateral 
relationship and the longer term.
Restoring the POLRI–AFP relationship 
after a political crisis
On 18 November 2013, two Australian media outlets 
carried revelations about Australian intelligence activities 
in Indonesia, leading to a swift fracture in the official 
relationship. The break was felt mainly in the defence and 
security domain, but it also created some ambiguity about 
bilateral dealings in general.
At present, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia 
and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop of Australia are negotiating 
a ‘code of conduct’ or protocol to guide future ties. They’re 
also managing other sensitive bilateral issues, including 
counter-people smuggling operations. What emerges from 
this negotiation will be important to POLRI and the AFP. 
While both police forces seem determined—as expressed in 
interviews for this report—to return to the close relationship 
of the past, this situation will create a ‘new normal’ that will 
influence the future police partnership.
The AFP–POLRI relationship today
The police-to-police relationship today is very strong, 
particularly in counterterrorism cooperation and at 
JCLEC, but it’s affected by the political winds. In this case, 
the intelligence controversy has led Indonesia to freeze 
cooperation on people smuggling and cybercrime. While the 
areas affected directly reflect domestic political priorities 
and the nature of the allegations about Australian activities, 
the freeze is concerning because police cooperation 
has been solid during other times of tension in the 
bilateral relationship.
It’s also concerning that POLRI inspected its communications 
equipment to ensure that it hadn’t been compromised, and 
that Australia was specifically mentioned as one country 
that might have ‘tapped and misused’ the equipment. 
Statements attributed to Dr Natalegawa recently about the 
importance of trust, and continued revelations courtesy of 
the Snowdon theft, also add to the ongoing tension.16 While 
the implications of these actions and statements should 
not be overdrawn, it’s possible that a trust deficit—perhaps 
only in the increasingly important cyber area—will emerge in 
the relationship.
This political tension also comes around a time when a 
number of initiatives that built the AFP–POLRI relationship 
have reached maturity or are no longer operating. Projects 
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Planning involving a steering group of senior serving and 
retired officers with strong attachments to the relationship 
and JCLEC should start as soon as possible.
Increasing the number of Indonesians with experience in 
Australia is another initiative for later in this period. This 
might include short courses or workshops in Canberra, 
with participants including future AFP and POLRI leaders. 
There are many options for subject matter. For instance, a 
workshop might focus on case studies of past operational 
successes and discuss the mechanics of good international 
partnerships, while promoting a transfer of knowledge 
between generations and building new relationships. 
Understanding whole-of-government operations and 
policymaking, again based on case studies, could also 
demonstrate the benefits of multiagency cooperation within 
and between the two countries. Another useful topic for 
workshops and courses is cybercrime, which should include 
government, academic and private-sector participants.
The leader-to-leader dimension of the relationship is also 
important. Senior-level visits to Jakarta and Canberra should 
take a priority, but it will be important to schedule them in 
an appropriate order and at a suitable rate. An opportunity 
for Australia’s Justice Minister to engage with Indonesian 
counterparts should also be found, including with the Chief 
of POLRI, who holds ministerial rank. This will ensure that 
the Australian minister responsible for the relationship is 
engaged and can build contacts too.
Returning to ‘business as usual’ is the third leg of the 
near-term strategy. The renewal of the three-year 
police-to-police framework, which is due in November 
2014, is one important aspect. Before then, there will be 
opportunities to facilitate some operational activities 
through the present arrangement. These activities should, in 
the main, stress the partnership between the AFP and POLRI 
and use the functioning structures in an optimal way.
One possible initiative that the AFP could take is to 
request POLRI assistance for the G20 meeting scheduled 
for November in Brisbane. These meetings require a 
large number of additional police, including specialists in 
intelligence, bomb data and forensics. Accordingly, the AFP 
could ask for support from a small number of POLRI experts 
in those areas and employ them in the main AFP work areas 
in Canberra. It would also be worth inviting POLRI to send a 
liaison officer to Brisbane for the event. Such requests would 
enhance transparency, send a clear message about mutual 
respect, and provide practical support at a time of high 
activity and international attention.
Should the opportunity arise, the AFP should also look to 
invite POLRI to participate in a joint investigation in Australia. 
While this has been done before, there are likely to be other, 
and perhaps more regular, opportunities for this kind of 
practical assistance.
relationships, and be prepared for change. It will be 
important to take nothing for granted, and to recognise 
the tight domestic political situation in Jakarta for the 
time being.
Other important factors are the shared interest in crime 
fighting, the track record of benefit described above, and the 
areas less affected by the current troubles. Specifically, this 
means making the most of cooperation on counterterrorism 
and transnational crime. It also means being ready with some 
targeted assistance in areas that promote agreed priorities. 
According to a retired senior Indonesian officer, that will 
always be welcomed by POLRI if it’s presented well. That 
both forces are in this relationship for the long term won’t 
hurt either.
Objectives and initiatives to restore the  
AFP–POLRI relationship
Given that the overall purpose of this relationship is to 
establish the best possible conditions for the rule of law in 
both countries—and so promote their shared interests in 
economic growth, democracy and security—the primary 
objective should be to re-establish a trusting partnership 
across all crime areas of mutual concern. We’ll know this 
objective has been achieved when the remaining phases of 
the Cyber Crime Investigation Centre project are complete, 
and cooperation is fully restored in both that area and in the 
people-smuggling domain (if that’s still necessary).
The forces should consider a range of initiatives designed 
to restart cooperation and enhance trust in this period (see 
figure 1). This will also help to remind both governments and 
both publics of the value of police–police cooperation, albeit 
in a subtle way.
People-to-people contact is likely to be the first area where 
full cooperation will be resumed. Indeed, all the AFP and 
POLRI officers interviewed for this project think the current 
tension has not damaged this aspect, although some note 
that the ambiguous situation has made some Indonesian 
officials hesitant to engage their Australian counterparts. 
Because these established relationships are not easily 
transferable, the AFP and POLRI should not change their 
senior liaison officers unless absolutely necessary during this 
period; stability in those positions will provide continuity in 
the relationship and ensure that people with experience are 
positioned to manage the resumption.
Opportunities to promote people-to-people links should also 
be pursued. One particularly auspicious milestone will occur 
soon: July 2014 will mark the 10-year anniversary of JCLEC. 
Given both forces’—and indeed governments’—shared pride 
in this facility and its achievements, it’s worth planning a 
major activity to mark this anniversary. While July mightn’t 
be convenient due to the Indonesian presidential election, 
the celebration could be held soon after the result is clear. 
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In addition, Australian law enforcement agencies might 
invite POLRI to support research projects on topics such as 
transnational crime in Australia, or the impact of Australian 
crime in Indonesia. The latter theme could highlight the 
operations of Australian criminal motorcycle gangs and 
paedophiles in Indonesia.
The AFP could also invite POLRI to assist with training 
and research in Australia. This might include instructors 
for disaster victim identification and forensic courses, or 
support for management training. Specialised workshops, 
which could provide information on the Indonesian security 
situation and counter-radicalisation, could be useful too. 
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Figure 1: Strategy map: near term
RE-ESTABLISH THE TRUSTING PARTNERSHIP ACROSS ALL  
CRIME AREAS OF MUTUAL CONCERN
PROMOTE THE SHARED BILATERAL INTEREST IN ECONOMIC GROWTH,  
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW
A return on investment: the future of police cooperation between Australia and Indonesia 11
Collaborative and broad: an outline 
strategy for the future AFP–POLRI 
relationship
The POLRI–AFP relationship has proven highly beneficial 
to both countries, but it will face challenges and a changing 
environment and its importance to both sides shouldn’t be 
taken for granted. We shouldn’t assume that both sides agree 
that the police relationship should be a priority, especially 
because it will compete with other relationships for resources 
and attention. So it’s important to examine how the 
AFP–POLRI relationship can maintain its relevance, because 
not doing so could lead to the continuation of out-of-date 
activities or misdirected new ones. 
This section outlines a strategy for the future of the 
AFP–POLRI relationship over the next 5–10 years (Figure 2). 
The strategy suggests objectives for the relationship, 
provides an overarching theme for engagement, and 
identifies new initiatives that both countries and their forces 
could undertake. The supporting basis of people-skills 
and resources is also considered because these are key 
contributors to a successful relationship.
A relationship with a future—and challenges
It’s possible to lose sight of the increasing importance of 
the relationship between Indonesia and Australia when 
the media is dominated by one or two issues. Despite 
that, a number of Australian and Indonesian analysts 
have looked at the effect of change in both countries 
and most see increasing economic, strategic and law 
enforcement connections.
Economic growth will be a leading contributor to change over 
the next decade. It’s likely that Indonesia’s GDP will exceed 
Australia’s within a few years.19 This would see Indonesia’s 
tech-savvy middle class increase dramatically within a 
decade, and they’ll want some of the trappings and vices of 
their Western counterparts.20 Australia, too, seeks ongoing 
prosperity and a diversified economic base. This need could 
see Indonesia become a greater source of opportunity for 
Australian business, tourism, education and research.21 
These factors mean that Australia and Indonesia are likely 
to become more open and economically important to each 
other over the next decade.
Indonesia’s strategic importance has long been a feature 
of Australian security policy, and it could increase in 
salience. As Hugh White notes, Indonesia’s increasing wealth 
and population mean that Australia might need to start 
thinking of its northern neighbour as a ‘great power’ within 
the decade, which is an unusual situation for Australian 
policymakers.22 This factor is likely to make the continued 
evolution of Indonesia’s democratic system a strategic 
factor, too.
Another piece of research that would be very useful is a law 
enforcement sector needs analysis in Indonesia. While the 
timing is flexible, the analysis should be Indonesian-led 
and internationally supported, and aim to provide better 
information on POLRI’s needs for international donors. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has already 
employed a suitable tool in Pakistan and is planning to apply 
that methodology across its program areas in Indonesia 
if it receives funding from international donors. Given the 
inflection point in the POLRI–AFP relationship, which is 
heightened by the completion of some recent and existing 
capacity building projects, a needs analysis could provide a 
good sense of Indonesian priorities and some new areas for 
mutually beneficial cooperation.
Achieving these goals needn’t be particularly expensive, 
and indeed may be offset in a few ways. There’s probably an 
opportunity to reduce the AFP’s presence in Indonesia and 
redirect those resources to initiatives that bring Indonesians 
here. And the Australian Government could also redirect 
some resources to the AFP–POLRI relationship, at least in the 
short term, as part of a broader package to strengthen the 
bilateral relationship.
The need for resources and flexibility points unequivocally to 
the need to re-establish the Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Program (LECP) in the next budget. Cutting it reduced the 
AFP’s ability to make and take opportunities overseas 
without reducing its effort in other areas, and, at around 
$1 million per year, the cut was only a very small contributor 
to the fiscal rebalancing effort.18 Again, there are other areas 
of security spending that could be reviewed to provide the 
necessary resources, including money spent domestically 
on counterterrorism, or in areas that promise to deliver 
‘sometime in the future’, such as most aspects of defence 
cooperation. While this might seem like shuffling deckchairs 
or robbing Peter, the LECP will be an essential contributor to 
restoring a relationship that delivers on a day-to-day basis.
Start preparing now
The current hiatus in the relationship is not only an 
impediment to bilateral cooperation: it’s also an opportunity. 
As these recommendations show, there are a number of 
ways for the AFP and POLRI to engage in constructive and 
operationally useful ways during this period. That some 
represent opportunities to engage POLRI in international 
activities in Australia, or draw upon its skills and knowledge, 
is important. Indeed, initiatives such as workshops, research, 
training and—critically—operational engagement will 
demonstrate that the partnership is genuine, interests are 
indeed shared, and activities are conducted for mutual 
benefit. This is important as the new ‘normal’ of the 
relationship is negotiated over the next 12 months or so, and 
as the relationship develops over the next 5–10 years.
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Figure 2: Strategy map: 5-to-10 years
PROMOTE THE SHARED BILATERAL INTEREST IN ECONOMIC GROWTH,  
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW
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presence in Indonesia. In the future, these challenges could 
extend to a possible reduction in Australia’s willingness to 
allocate resources to this relationship. Furthermore, internal 
competition between POLRI and the Indonesian Army over 
internal security functions looks set to continue, while 
expectations about POLRI’s accountability and resistance to 
corruption are likely to rise. These factors make it essential to 
think more closely about the police-to-police relationship so 
that it suits both governments’ future needs and overcomes 
these challenges.
What should the AFP and POLRI try to achieve 
over the next 5–10 years?
This analysis of the ongoing need for the AFP–POLRI 
partnership shows considerable continuity with the past, 
but it’s possible that the dominant concerns of the past 
15 years could wane. For example, recent Australian policy 
changes might foil people smugglers and there might not be 
an upsurge in Indonesian terrorist attacks over the next few 
years. This uncertainty makes basing a future relationship on 
those particular shared interests risky, and probably not the 
best way to sustain a durable and responsive partnership.
It’s also possible that the atmosphere in the broader bilateral 
relationship might contain considerable uncertainty for some 
time yet. This could keep some brittleness in the relationship 
and expose the police-to-police relationship to the political 
issues of the day.
A long-term strategy for the AFP–POLRI relationship should 
have, as its primary objective, promoting the shared bilateral 
interest in enhancing economic growth, democracy and 
security through the rule of law. This is the central value of 
the bilateral relationship, and professional police-to-police 
interaction promotes it.
But it’s possible to extend the objectives of the relationship 
in three other areas. First, there’s value in encouraging 
POLRI’s own institution-building efforts, because it continues 
to face competition over its internal security functions 
and increasing expectations to be more transparent and 
accountable. This last factor, while sensitive and needing 
careful discussion and management, was one mentioned by 
numerous POLRI officers interviewed for this project. Second, 
it’s possible to use the police-to-police relationship to 
promote whole-of-government law enforcement cooperation 
in Indonesia and Australia. Third, there’s an opportunity to 
promote the shared interests of both nations in stability and 
the rule of law in the Southeast Asian region, to the extent 
that that’s practical and mutually agreed.
To achieve these objectives, opportunities to broaden the 
relationship’s focus, both geographically and thematically, 
should be a priority. Those opportunities should be pursued 
in areas that make the most of AFP–POLRI interoperability. 
In particular, the strategy should include cooperative 
The increasing exposure of both countries to the 
international economic system and each other means that 
they’ll continue to face common criminal threats. Drug 
production and smuggling is likely to grow in importance, 
particularly as Indonesian criminals become producers of 
cheap methamphetamines like ‘ice’. While these drugs are 
mainly produced for Indonesian consumption at present23, 
the increasing presence of transnational crime gangs, 
including criminal motorcycle gangs from Australia, means 
that Indonesia is becoming a source and transit country for 
drug importation into Australia.24
Cybercrime was mentioned as a rising concern by a number 
of law enforcers interviewed for this project. While many 
mentioned the benefits that police obtain by exploiting 
cyber-evidence from criminal activities, cooperation has 
also helped to disrupt cybercrime at its source in Indonesia, 
according to an AFP officer. That cyber cooperation is 
currently under a cloud is a real concern, because the AFP 
and POLRI have achieved significant results by working 
together in the cybersphere on crimes such as money 
laundering, child exploitation and drug trafficking. It’s also 
helped in the fight against terrorism in Indonesia.
That’s important because the terrorist threat in Indonesia 
is likely to remain for some time. Indonesian and Australian 
experts interviewed for this project think that the impending 
release of some involved in the 2002 Bali bombings and a new 
cohort of extremists returning from Syria might give terrorist 
groups more capacity and skills. Such a change is likely 
to promote further interest in bilateral counterterrorism 
cooperation, and possibly also increased foreign assistance.
Of course, there are a number of other types of crime that 
concern both countries. For example, Indonesia is a target 
for Australian paedophiles, whether they’re in Indonesia or 
using the internet. Indonesia also serves as a transit point 
to Australia for irregular migrants, and from Australia for 
smuggled wildlife.
But managing economic, strategic and law enforcement 
change will pose challenges for both countries. In 
addition to the changes and uncertainties mentioned 
above, promoting economic development and dealing 
with non-traditional security issues in Indonesia require 
continued improvement to the rule of law in that country. 
This is important because corruption, weaknesses in its legal 
system, and poor bureaucratic and ministerial coordination 
are often mentioned as barriers to Indonesian growth and 
cooperation.25 On the softer side, the currently narrow base 
of people-to-people links is also seen as a factor that limits 
mutual understanding.26
These and other practical issues will create challenges 
for future police-to-police cooperation. Along with the 
changing needs of both forces, the potential trust deficit 
in the cyber area and the other factors mentioned above, 
it’s also worth noting the impost created by a large AFP 
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This gap could be filled with a POLRI–AFP alumni association. 
This initiative would reinforce the links between the two 
forces. It could be based on the successful models used by 
Indonesia’s LEMHANAS and the defence alumni association, 
IKAHAN.28 It should be overseen by a board representing the 
most senior POLRI and AFP officers with experience in the 
relationship, whose remit would be to guide the association 
and encourage participation. The key membership group 
should be those with shared operational experience and 
those who’ve worked on capacity building initiatives such 
as JCLEC, the Transnational Crime Coordination Centre and 
the Bomb Data Centre. Also included should be those who’ve 
undertaken training activities at JCLEC or in Australia.
Such an association needs to get beyond websites and 
the occasional cocktail party. The program should include 
study tours that refresh serving officers on the relationship 
and shorter professional development experiences such 
as seminars and workshops. Importantly, alumni activities 
should also create opportunities for junior officers to meet 
their seniors. This is a very attractive feature of IKAHAN for 
Indonesian Army officers because the size of their force limits 
such interaction. Given POLRI’s similar size, this feature 
could help to encourage participation and add value to 
the experience.
Enhancing leader-to-leader links
Australia and Indonesia already have strong mechanisms 
for leader-to-leader consultations, but, as explained above, 
there’s no standing arrangement that would allow the 
minister responsible for the AFP, usually the Justice Minister, 
to engage with Indonesian leaders on police matters. While 
there’s some asymmetry between the two systems, there are 
ways around that.
One could be to create a law enforcement meeting, 
where the Australian Justice Minister hosts Indonesian 
ministers responsible for counterpart Indonesian agencies, 
including POLRI’s chief. Also included could be the heads 
of relevant Australian agencies, including Customs and the 
Australian Crime Commission. This meeting could focus 
on practical law enforcement cooperation, which would 
leave engagement in the new Australia–Indonesia Law and 
Justice Ministers Meeting to focus on legal and other policy 
matters. Such a meeting could also present law enforcement 
as a whole of-government activity that requires political 
leadership and cooperation and coordination between 
many agencies.
New capacity building activities
Given the depth and maturity of this relationship, new ideas 
must be based on mutual desire and need, so it’s essential 
for both forces to understand and share their needs and 
translate them into projects.
activities in Australia, in Indonesia (including in the provincial 
police commands) and in the Southeast Asian region. The 
purpose of this broader geographical focus is to give both 
governments the highest possible stake in maintaining law 
enforcement cooperation, even if the bilateral relationship is 
troubled. It’s also possible that, by demonstrating the value 
of cooperation for crime fighting and respective international 
objectives, the AFP–POLRI relationship can add some ballast 
to the bilateral relationship.27
The success of the relationship should be judged in practical 
terms. Measures should include successful joint operations, 
be they physical or cyber-based. Also relevant are shared 
educational outcomes, which include the number of 
participants in courses jointly sponsored by the AFP and 
POLRI and the content of those courses. Success should 
also be measured by the instances in which both forces have 
provided information that reduces crime. Only then should 
the measures turn to the intangible, such as the relationship’s 
contribution to the ‘atmosphere’ of bilateral ties or the way it 
promotes international goals. In this way, both governments 
will be able to identify and analyse the value of the 
police-to-police relationship over time.
Longer term initiatives to enhance the  
AFP–POLRI relationship
The AFP and POLRI could take a number of initiatives 
to enhance and sustain their relationship over the next 
5–10 years in ways that contribute to the objectives described 
above. The suggestion is to sequence these activities over 
a few years to allow consultation and to ensure that each is 
effectively implemented, and to avoid a rush of activities that 
might strain the capacity of both organisations. It’s worth 
starting this discussion with people-to-people links because 
they can be the easiest to implement.
Building people-to-people links
As this report shows, both police forces have achieved 
significant operational outcomes, developed a leading 
educational institution, and achieved a level of 
interoperability. But the nature of police service means 
that people move on, so new links need to be formed. And 
the challenge of sustaining long-distance friendships over 
time—and managing strains in the bilateral relationship—can 
diminish the remaining contacts. It’s also worth finding 
a way to keep retired officers engaged because they can 
help smooth troubled waters, especially in the Indonesian 
system. However, at present, there’s no structured way for 
the AFP and POLRI to achieve any of those outcomes. It’s left 
to chance.
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opportunities provide a chance for new trainees in both 
nations to learn about the value of the relationship.
Sustaining capacity initiatives
It will be important to identify some new directions in 
capacity building and to deliver them in a multiagency 
context. At present, a significant amount of cooperation—but 
not all—is delivered between counterpart Indonesian and 
Australian agencies. While practical now, that’s not totally 
desirable because it reinforces the barriers mentioned above. 
It’s also possible that some current cooperation activities 
might actually work at cross-purposes. For instance, 
Defence’s counterterrorism cooperation with the Indonesian 
Army is completely pragmatic from an Australian viewpoint, 
but makes it harder for POLRI to assert its responsibility for 
that area.
Both nations should encourage cross-agency and 
multiagency working as a way of increasing both the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of cooperation. One initiative 
that already delivers programs in this way is JCLEC. That 
initiative should be sustained into the future: its model 
and practices are robust and flexible, and its facilities are a 
long-term investment. While JCLEC’s strategic plan for the 
next five years is nearing completion, it’s worth noting that 
the facility is running close to its physical capacity. While 
more courses could probably be done with tight scheduling, 
new offerings would probably come at the expense of 
established activities.
There are other ways to increase JCLEC’s utility and 
throughput—and train a broader range of international 
police, POLRI officers (including provincial-level officers) 
and other Indonesian officials. This training could include 
police leadership, tailored courses on transnational crime 
recognition and investigation, and multiagency approaches 
to law enforcement challenges. Courses on matters of intense 
interest in Indonesia—including protecting police officers 
from terrorism and protecting domestic workers overseas—
might also be welcome. 
In addition to current plans to expand the use of 
computer-based training and to deliver courses in different 
locations, JCLEC could also consider mixed-mode delivery, 
including teleconferences. This would increase the intimacy 
and responsiveness of distance education courses and the 
sources of instructional support. While this initiative will 
require an investment in teleconferencing equipment and 
maintenance, POLRI’s internal command system would 
benefit from that investment too.
It will be important to sustain cooperation in forensic and 
bomb data so that both forces remain broadly interoperable 
in those areas. In addition, the cyber area is particularly 
suitable for future multiagency law enforcement cooperation. 
While this report hasn’t had the benefit of extensive 
consultations, discussions with Australian and Indonesian 
officials and an examination of the broader environment have 
identified areas where both forces could cooperate in new 
capacity building activities. As POLRI and the AFP produce a 
formal plan for their cooperation, consultation should occur 
through the existing senior officers meeting mechanism and 
perhaps through the ministerial forum suggested above. 
The proposed internationally-facilitated needs analysis 
would provide an evidence base for future cooperation and 
resource requests.
The people-to-people initiatives proposed above can be 
complemented by inviting some junior POLRI officers to 
participate in long-term secondments with the AFP. Under 
this scheme, selected officers would receive intensive 
language training and then play either line or specialist 
advisory roles within the AFP. The areas for secondments 
could include disaster victim identification, forensics, 
protection, community policing management and high-tech 
crime investigation. POLRI could also provide instructors on 
some AFP training courses, which would further enhance the 
Indonesian force’s professional reputation while reducing a 
cost to the AFP.
It’s also possible to use similar secondments in corporate 
areas. Work in strategic planning, acquisition, human 
resource management, finance and fraud control would 
give AFP and POLRI officers significant exposure to 
the management of their counterpart institutions. For 
Indonesians attached to the AFP, this would include 
exposure to whole-of-government policy development and 
implementation, which could help address (in a small way) 
one of the current barriers to investment and economic 
growth in Indonesia.
In time, and with appropriate consultation, secondments 
might also be considered for the intelligence and cyber 
analysis areas. Some will draw a deep breath at this 
suggestion, because these are very sensitive areas. But 
if the AFP is to demonstrate full trust in their Indonesian 
colleagues, and if Indonesia is to develop long-term trust 
in information sharing and cyber cooperation, the AFP 
should seriously consider giving POLRI some access to 
these functions.
A shorter program of exchange visits for senior POLRI 
and AFP officers could be another relationship- and 
institution-building activity. Such exchanges—lasting 
perhaps two weeks each way—would allow counterpart 
officers to gain a deeper understanding of the other 
force while developing close associations between the 
officers involved.
Of course, this opportunity could be extended to officers 
during or soon after their initial training. While this move 
would be more suited to the Indonesian system, such 
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Myanmar’s process of political change has some similarities 
with Indonesia’s experience. The most pertinent factor is 
the transition of Myanmar’s police force to an independent 
institution from its subordinate position under the Army. 
While the situations aren’t exactly the same, observers of 
Myanmar’s security sector report that its police force also 
lacks technical crime investigation skills, and has broader 
needs for institutional capacity building and assistance with 
cultural change.30
One proposal involves POLRI and the AFP working together to 
deliver police training in Myanmar. This could be conducted 
under a trilateral agreement with Myanmar or organised 
multinationally through the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime or ASEANAPOL. Regardless of the mechanics, the 
training could focus on shared transnational crime concerns, 
which could include drug production and smuggling, 
people smuggling, child sex tourism, human trafficking and 
economic crimes, especially money laundering.
Courses delivered under this initiative should be a true 
partnership, using POLRI, Myanmar police and AFP 
instructors wherever practical. Assistance should also be 
provided to help the Myanmar police gain experience in 
modern training systems and course management. Trial 
courses should first test the concept. If they’re successful, the 
program could expand to include new facilities, permanent 
staff and perhaps, in time, a JCLEC-like venture focused on 
drugs or human trafficking.
The value of this proposal lies in the shared Australian and 
Indonesian interest in Myanmar as a source for significant 
transnational crime, its democratic transition, and the 
centrality of the rule of law to that transition. It would also 
build on the AFP’s current program of cooperation with the 
Myanmar police and provide a demonstration of Indonesian 
and Australian police cooperation. In future, this approach 
could be extended into the Pacific, and perhaps in Cambodia 
once political conditions change there.
Supporting the strategy—language training
It’s also timely for both forces, particularly on the Australian 
side, to enhance their officers’ ‘soft’ skills. Time and again in 
interviews, serving and former AFP officers spoke about their 
limited preparation for postings to Indonesia. While language 
training was mentioned most often, the need for education in 
culture, government and law was also raised.
The AFP received dedicated resources for language training 
in the past, but this funding has gone even though the 
need has not diminished.31 As the Australian National Audit 
Office’s Fighting terrorism at its source audit identified, a 
very large proportion of AFP officers deploying to Southeast 
Asia receive no language training before their posting. 
Finishing current projects, particularly the satellite cyber 
offices in Indonesia, should be the first priority, but it would 
also be worth leveraging this established relationship to build 
trust, and then to use it in a broad push that would be useful 
to the bilateral relationship as a whole. Areas for capacity 
building here will include policy discussions, education, 
legislative development and standard setting, and practical 
cooperation to share information, fix problems and defeat 
threats emanating from or using the cybersphere.
A number of interviewees mentioned strategic intelligence—
which identifies patterns and trends in criminal activity, 
as distinct from targeting individual criminals—as a key 
area that’s currently underemphasised and ripe for further 
cooperation. This has been recognised by the AFP, which 
started a comprehensive engagement program with POLRI’s 
peak intelligence branch in 2013. This work could build 
on the existing joint Transnational Crime Assessment and 
include advice and assistance to build a multiagency criminal 
intelligence system for Indonesia and deeper strategic 
assessments on issues of mutual interest.
Cooperation to engage business
The difficulty in exchanging information on criminal threats 
with businesses in Indonesia might be another basis for a 
future cooperative program into the future. This program 
could provide information to Indonesian and Australian 
companies, regardless of where they work in Australia 
or Indonesia. It could start with basic briefings and 
countermeasures advice for business, and perhaps evolve 
over time into a ‘trusted information sharing network’. One 
model to consider is the US State Department’s Overseas 
Security Advisory Council, but with a broader mandate and 
perhaps based in police, rather than diplomatic, cooperation. 
Another possibility is working through an Indonesian 
non-government organisation, such as the Indonesian Crime 
Prevention Foundation.29 Either way, the aim is to foster the 
rule of law by promoting the ability of businesses to protect 
themselves from crime.
Working together to achieve international 
objectives
The benefits of previous capacity building in POLRI and the 
existing track record of cooperation in the international 
sphere coalesce in the last major recommendation of this 
report. During the past few years, a number of forensics 
initiatives have matured, and quite a few AFP officers noted 
that POLRI officers had achieved a level of competency on a 
par with their former mentors. This is an outstanding result 
and one that should be leveraged as a way of demonstrating 
value from previous investments.
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Conclusion: leveraging the relationship
The AFP–POLRI relationship has broadened in both 
scope and depth over the years, and it’s been founded 
on operational success, but the current environment has 
created an inflection point in the relationship. This provides 
both forces with the need and opportunity to consider 
their future and how the relationship might be pursued for 
mutual benefit.
There’s good reason to believe that the police-to-police 
relationship will return to a close and productive basis once 
current political tensions are resolved, but it’s smart to 
recognise that the relationship and both forces’ needs will 
change—and the magnitude of change will be related to the 
duration and depth of the current ‘freeze’ and the outcome of 
the negotiated code. Having a clear re-engagement strategy, 
which should be based on demonstrating respect and 
building trust, is essential. Some resource flexibility for the 
AFP—which has been reduced lately—will be needed to take 
advantage of opportunities as they arise.
This outline of a longer term strategy for the AFP–POLRI 
relationship is based on the judgement that this partnership 
will remain in the interests of both nations for the foreseeable 
future. That judgement is built on an analysis of past benefits, 
a view that criminal threats will be even more salient to 
national interests in the future, and an assessment that 
police forces are essential tools of national policy.
The principal outcome—promoting economic growth, 
security and democracy through the rule of law—can 
be achieved by further spreading the focus of activity 
across Indonesia; building an alumni; conducting more 
long-duration activities in Australia; conducting more 
activities in multiagency settings and with the business 
sector; and drawing upon past investments and mutual 
interests to cooperate on police development in 
Myanmar. This broader approach will allow the AFP and 
POLRI to refresh their cooperative engagement, make 
sure it’s relevant to future needs, and give it a more 
outward-looking perspective.
All these things are important because they’ll leverage shared 
capability and add ballast to the bilateral relationship. But 
neither government should lose sight of the police-to-police 
relationship’s core benefit: cooperation against crime. 
This benefit will become even more important as criminal 
challenges become more complex. It’s also likely that joint 
action will be needed to protect security or to investigate 
major crimes, such as terrorist attacks.
Having police forces that are capable, able to work together 
and ready to help each other has been an essential 
component of the Australia–Indonesia relationship in the 
recent past. It’s clearly worth an investment to sustain this 
unique relationship in the future.
When asked about this, AFP officers identified opportunity 
cost as a major impediment to language training: while an 
officer is away for training, others need to do their work. 
Given the undoubted (but unquantified) benefit of language 
competence32, it would be worth allocating resources to 
the AFP for a ‘training increment’ of officers. This would 
allow officers to be formally posted to language training for 
perhaps 8–12 months, and allow their old positions to be 
filled by new officers.
While information on English-language preparation for 
POLRI officers isn’t as readily available, it was mentioned 
by interviewees. Indeed, two thought that short courses in 
Australia didn’t always represent good value for Indonesian 
officers without suitable English-language skills. This is one 
reason why longer term secondments are proposed above—
they would remove ‘demonstrated language competence’ as 
a selection factor and open positions to a broader range of 
candidates. While these proposals will have consequences 
for human resource policies and require more resources, 
they ultimately offer ways to get even more from the bilateral 
police relationship.
Supporting the strategy—resources
No strategy is complete without an understanding of 
the resources involved. The most expensive suggestions 
presented here are likely to be the POLRI secondments to 
Australia, teleconferencing, additional language training, 
cooperation in Myanmar, reinstatement of the LECP and 
the alumni program. While it’s not feasible to cost these 
initiatives, it will always be hard to find new money. 
Fortunately, there are some sources that could be utilised or 
redirected by the Australian Government.
The first involves trade-offs in current spending. These could 
include reducing the size of the AFP’s presence in Indonesia 
over the next year, particularly if there’s less need for direct 
AFP involvement in the Indonesian Transnational Crime 
Centre and if the number of people-smuggling ventures falls. 
Of course, any change should be the result of discussions 
with POLRI. Allowing the AFP to redirect this funding to other 
initiatives would provide a positive incentive to change.
New sources could be found, too. Unexplained wealth 
confiscations are one way to fund some initiatives; perhaps 
there could be an incentive to invite Indonesian to cooperate 
in relevant investigations. Some targeted investments 
in new cooperation might be used, especially to protect 
Commonwealth revenue.
Another source is Australia’s official development assistance. 
While it’s already used for law enforcement purposes, a 
change to give the ‘rule of law’ greater prominence in the 
post-2015 development agenda would make the link more 
explicit and more available as a tool to assist POLRI.33
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